Arnobius Search This Resource     in this Authorin this Sectionin all Sections   Navigator (Page 1 of 7) Previous Next   Page2   Buy This Resource 10 Volumes HardCover $275.00 10 Volumes Library Binding $299.00  Show me more …   Book II.(1) 1. Here, if any means could be found, I should wish to converse thus with all those who hate the name of Christ, turning aside for a little from the defence primarily set up:-If you think it no dishonour to answer when asked a question, explain to us and say what is the cause, what the reason, that you pursue Christ with so bitter hostility? or what offences you remember which He did, that at the mention of His name you are roused to bursts of mad and savage fury?(2) Did He ever, in claiming for Himself power as king, fill the whole world with bands of the fiercest soldiers; and of nations at peace from the beginning, did He destroy and put an end to some, and compel others to submit to His yoke and serve Him? Did He ever, excited by grasping(3) avarice, claim as His own by right all that wealth to have abundance of which men strive eagerly? Did He ever, transported with lustful passions, break down by force the barriers of purity, or stealthily lie in wait for other men's wives? Did He ever, puffed up with haughty arrogance, inflict at random injuries and insults, without any distinction of persons? (B) And He was not worthy that you should listen to and believe Him, yet He should not have been despised by you even on this account, that He showed to you things concerning your salvation, that He prepared for you a path(4) to heaven, and the immortality for which you long; although(5) He neither extended the light of life to all, nor delivered all from the danger which threatens them through their ignorance.(6) 2. But indeed, some one will say, He deserved our hatred because He has driven religion(7) from the world, because He has kept men back from seeking to honour the gods.(8) Is He then denounced as the destroyer of religion and promoter of impiety, who brought true religion into the world, who opened the gates of piety to men blind and verily living in impiety, and pointed out to whom they should bow themselves? Or is there any truer religion-one more serviceable,(9) powerful, and right-than to have learned to know the supreme God, to know how to pray to God Supreme, who alone is the source and fountain of all good, the creator,(10) founder, and framer of all that endures, by whom all things on earth and all in heaven are quickened, and filled with the stir of life, and without whom there would assuredly be nothing to bear any name, and have any substance? But perhaps you doubt whether there is that ruler of whom we speak, and rather incline to believe in the existence of Apollo, Diana, Mercury, Mars, Give a true judgment;(11) and, looking round on all these things which we see, any one will rather doubt whether all the other gods exist, than hesitate with regard to the God whom we all know by nature, whether when we cry out, O God, or when we make God the witness of wicked deeds,(12) and raise our face to heaven as though He saw us. 3. But He did not permit men to make supplication to the lesser gods. Do you, then, know who are, or where are the lesser gods? Has mistrust of them, or the way in which they were mentioned, ever touched you, so that you are justly indignant that their worship has been done away with and deprived of all honour?(13) But if haughtiness of mind and arrogance,(14) as it is called by the Greeks, did not stand in your way and hinder you, you might long ago have been able to understand what He forbade to be done, or wherefore; within what limits He would have true religion lie;(15) what danger arose to you from that which you thought obedience? or from what evils you would escape if you broke away from your dangerous delusion. 4. But all these things will be more clearly and distinctly noticed when we have proceeded further. For we shall show that Christ did not teach the nations impiety, but delivered ignorant and wretched then from those who most wickedly wronged them.(16) We do not believe, you say, that what He says is true. What, then? Have you no doubt as to the things which(17) you say are not true, while, as they are only at hand, and not yet disclosed(18) they can by no means be disproved? But He, too, does not prove what He promises. It is so; for, as I said, there can be no proof of things still in the future. Since, then, the nature of the future is such that it cannot be grasped and comprehended by any anticipation,(19) is it not more rational,(20) of two things uncertain and hanging in doubtful suspense, rather to believe that which carries with it some hopes, than that which brings none at all? For in the one case there is no danger, if that which is said to be at hand should prove vain and groundless; in the other there is the greatest loss, even(21) the loss of salvation, if, when the time has come, it be shown that there was nothing false in what was declared.(22) 5. What say you, O ignorant ones, for whom we might well weep and be sad?(23) Are you so void of fear that these things may be true which are despised by you and turned to ridicule? and do you not consider with yourselves at least, in your secret thoughts, lest that which to-day with perverse obstinacy you refuse to believe, time may too late show to be true,(24) and ceaseless remorse punish you? Do not even these proofs at least give you faith to believe,(25) viz., that already, in so short and brief a time, the oaths of this vast army have spread abroad over all the earth? that already there is no nation so rude and fierce that it has not, changed by His love, subdued its fierceness, and with tranquillity hitherto unknown, become mild m disposition?(26) that men endowed with so great abilities, orators, critics, rhetoricians, lawyers, and physicians, those, too, who pry into the mysteries of philosophy, seek to learn these things, despising those in which but now they trusted? that slaves choose to be tortured by their masters as they please, wives to be divorced, children to be disinherited by their parents, rather than be unfaithful to Christ and cast off the oaths of the warfare of salvation? that although so terrible punishments have been denounced by you against those who follow the precepts of this religion, it(27) increases even more, and a great host strives more boldly against all threats and the terrors which would keep it back, and is roused to zealous faith by the very attempt to hinder it? Do you indeed believe that these things happen idly and at random? that these feelings are adopted on being met with by chance?(28) Is not this, then, sacred and divine? Or do you believe that, without God's grace, their minds are so changed, that although murderous hooks and other tortures without number threaten, as we said, those who shall believe, they receive the grounds of faith with which they have become acquainted,(29) as if carried away (A) by some charm, and by an eager longing for all the virtues,(30) and prefer the friendship of Christ to all that is in the world?(31) 6. But perhaps those seem to you weak-minded and silly, who even now are uniting all over the world, and joining together to assent with that readiness of belief at which you mock.(32) What then? Do you alone, imbued(33) with the true power of wisdom and understanding, see something wholly different(34) and profound? Do you alone perceive that all these things are trifles? you alone, that those things are mere words and childish absurdities which we declare are about to come to us from the supreme Ruler? Whence, pray, has so much wisdom been given to you? whence so much subtlety and wit? Or from what scientific training have you been able to gain so much wisdom, to derive so much foresight? Because you are skilled in declining verbs and nouns by cases and tenses, and(35) in avoiding barbarous words and expressions; because you have learned either to express yourselves in(36) harmonious, and orderly, and fitly-disposed language, or to know when it is rude and unpolished;(37) because you have stamped on your memory the Fornix of Lucilius,(38) and Marsyas of Pomponius; because you know what the issues to be proposed in lawsuits are, how many kinds of cases there are, how many ways of pleading, what the genus is, what the species, by what methods an opposite is distinguished from a contrary,-do you therefore think that you know what is false, what true, what can or cannot be done, what is the nature of the lowest and highest? Have the well-known words never rung in(39) your ears, that the wisdom of man is foolishness with God? 7. In the first place, you yourselves, too,(40) see clearly that, if you ever discuss obscure subjects, and seek to lay bare the mysteries of nature, on the one hand you do not know the very things which you speak of, which you affirm, which you uphold very often with especial zeal, and that each one defends with obstinate resistance his own suppositions as though they were proved and ascertained truths. For how can we of ourselves know whether we(41) perceive the truth, even if all ages be employed in seeking out knowledge-we whom some envious power(42) brought forth, and formed so ignorant and proud, that, although we know nothing at all, we yet deceive ourselves, and are uplifted by pride and arrogance so as to suppose ourselves possessed of knowledge? For, to pass by divine things, and those plunged in natural obscurity, can any man explain that which in the Phaedrus(43) the well-known Socrates cannot comprehend-what man is, or whence he is, uncertain, changeable, deceitful, manifold, of many kinds? for what purposes he was produced? by whose ingenuity he was devised? what he does in the world? (C) why he undergoes such countless ills? whether the earth gave life to him as to worms and mice, being affected with decay through the action of some moisture;(44) or whether he received(45) these outlines of body, and this cast of face, from the hand of some maker and framer? Can he, I say, know these things, which lie open to all, and are recognisable by(46) the senses common to all,-by what causes we are plunged into sleep, by what we awake? in what ways dreams are produced, in what they are seen? nay rather-as to which Plato in the Theoetetus(47) is in doubt-whether we are ever awake, or whether that very state which is called waking is part of an unbroken slumber? and what we seem to do when we say that we see a dream? whether we see by means of rays of light proceeding towards the object,(48) or images of the objects fly to and alight on the pupils of our eyes? whether the flavour is in the things tasted, or arises from their touching the palate? from what causes hairs lay aside their natural darkness, and do not become gray all at once, but by adding little by little? why it is that all fluids, on mingling, form one whole; that oil, on the contrary, does not suffer the others to be poured into it,(49) but is ever brought together clearly into its own impenetrable(50) substance? finally, why the soul also, which is said by you to be immortal and divine,(51) is sick in men who are sick, senseless in children, worn out in doting, silly,(52) and crazy old age? Now the weakness and wretched ignorance of these theories is greater on this account, that while it may happen that we at times say something which is true,(53) we cannot be sure even of this very thing, whether we have spoken the truth at all. 8. And since you have been wont to laugh at our faith, and with droll jests to pull to pieces our readiness of belief too, say, O wits, soaked and filled with wisdom's pure drought, is there in life any kind of business demanding diligence and activity, which the doers(54) undertake, engage in, and essay, without believing that it can be done? Do you travel about, do you sail on the sea without believing that you will return home when your business is done? Do you break up the earth with the plough, and fill it with different kinds of seeds without believing that you will gather in the fruit with the changes of the seasons? Do you unite with partners in marriage,(55) without believing that it will be pure, and a union serviceable to the husband? Do you beget children without believing that they will pass(56) safely through the different stages of life to the goal of age? Do you commit your sick bodies to the hands of physicians, without believing that diseases can be relieved by their severity being lessened? Do you wage wars with your enemies, without believing that you will carry off the victory by success in battles?(57) Do you worship and serve the gods without believing that they are, and that they listen graciously to your prayers? 9. What, have you seen with your eyes, and handled(58) with your hands, those things which you write yourselves, which you read from time to time on subjects placed beyond human knowledge? Does not each one trust this author or that? That which any one has persuaded himself is said with truth by another, does he not defend with a kind of assent, as it were, like that of faith? Does not he who says that fire(59) or water is the origin of all things, pin his faith to Thales or Heraclitus? he who places the cause of all in numbers, to Pythagoras of Samos, and to Archytas? he who divides the soul, and sets up bodiless forms, to Plato, the disciple of Socrates? he who adds a fifth element(60) to the primary causes, to Aristotle, the father of the Peripatetics? he who threatens the world with destruction by fire, and says that when the time comes it will be set on fire, to Panaetius, Chrysippus, Zeno? he who is always fashioning worlds from atoms,(61) and destroying them, to Epicurus, Democritus, Metrodorus? he who says that nothing is comprehended by man, and that all things are wrapt in dark obscurity,(62) to Archesilas,(63) to Carneades?-to some teacher, in fine, of the old and later Academy? 10. Finally, do not even the leaders and founders of the schools(64) already mentioned, say those very things(65) which they do say through belief in their own ideas? For, did Heraclitus see things produced by the changes of fires? Thales, by the condensing of water?(66) Did Pythagoras see them spring from number?(67) Did Plato see the bodiless forms? Democritus, the meeting together of the atoms? Or do those who assert that nothing at all can be comprehended by man, know whether what they say is true, so as to(68) understand that the very proposition which they lay down is a declaration of truth?(69) Since, then, you have discovered and learned nothing, and are led by credulity to assert all those things which you write, and comprise in thousands of books; what kind of judgment, pray, is this, so unjust that you mock at faith in us, while you see that you have it in common with our readiness of belief?(70) But you say you believe wise men, well versed in all kinds of learning!-those, forsooth, who know nothing, and agree in nothing which they say; who join battle with their opponents on behalf of their own opinions, and are always contending fiercely with obstinate hostility; who, overthrowing, refuting, and bringing to nought the one the other's doctrines, have made all things doubtful, and have shown from their very want of agreement that nothing can he known. 11. But, supposing that these things do not at all hinder or prevent your being bound to believe and hearken to them in great measure;(71) and what reason is there either that you should have more liberty in this respect, or that we should have less? You believe Plato,(72) Cronius,(73) Numenius, or any one you please; we believe and confide in Christ.(74) How unreasonable it is, that when we both abide(75) by teachers, and have one and the same thing, belief, in common, you should wish it to be granted to you to receive what is so(76) said by them, but should be unwilling to hear and see what is brought forward by Christ! And yet, if we chose to compare cause with cause, we are better able to point out what we have followed in Christ, than you to point out what you have followed in the philosophers. And we, indeed, have followed in him these things-those glorious works and most potent virtues which he manifested and displayed in diverse miracles, by which any one might be led to feel the necessity of believing, and might decide with confidence that they were not such as might be regarded as man's, but such as showed some divine and unknown power. What virtues did you follow in the philosophers, that it was more reasonable for you to believe them than for us to believe Christ? Was any one of them ever able by one word, or by a single command, I will not say to restrain, to check(77) the madness of the sea or the fury of the storm; to restore their sight to the blind, or give it to men blind from their birth; to call the dead back to life; to put an end to the sufferings of years; but-and this is much easier(78) -to heal by one rebuke a boil, a scab, or a thorn fixed in the skin? Not that we deny either that they are worthy of praise for the soundness of their morals, or that they are skilled in all kinds of studies and learning; for we know that they both speak in the most elegant language, and that their words flow in polished periods; that they reason in syllogisms with the utmost acuteness; that they arrange their inferences in due order;(79) that they express, divide, distinguish principles by definitions; that they say many things about the different kinds of numbers, many things about music; that by their maxims and precepts(80) they settle the problems of geometry also. But what has that to do with the case? Do enthymemes, syllogisms, and other such things, assure us that these men know what is true? or are they therefore such that credence should necessarily be given to them with regard to very obscure subjects? A comparison of persons must be decided, not by vigour of eloquence, but by the excellence of the works which they have done. He must not(81) be called a good teacher who has expressed himself clearly,(82) but he who accompanies his promises with the guarantee of divine works. FOOTNOTES: There has been much confusion in dealing with the first seven chapters of this book, owing to the leaves of the ms. having been arranged in wrong order, as was pointed out at an early period by some one who noted on the margin that there was some transposition. To this circumstance, however, Oehler alone seems to have called attention; but the corruption was so manifest, that the various editors gave themselves full liberty to re-arrange and dispose the text more correctly. The first leaf of the ms. concludes with the words sine ullius personae discriminibus inrogavit, "without any distinction of person," and is followed by one which begins with the words (A, end of c. 5) et non omnium virtutum, "and (not) by an eager longing," and ends tanta experiatur examina, "undergoes such countless ills" (middle of c. 7). The third and fourth leaves begin with the words (B. end of c. 1) utrum in cunctos...amoverit? qui si dignos, "Now if He was not worthy" (see notes), and run on to end of c. 5, quadam dulcedine, "by some charm;" while the fifth (C, middle of c. 7) begins atque ne (or utrumne) illum, "whether the earth," and there is no further difficulty. This order is retained in the first ed., and also by Hildebrand, who supposes three lacunae at A, B, and C, to account for the abruptness and want of connection; but it is at once seen that, on changing the order of the leaves, so that they shall run B A C, the argument and sense are perfectly restored. This arrangement seems to have been first adopted in LB., and is followed by the later editors, with the exception of Hildebrand. Lit., "boil up with the ardours of furious spirits." Lit., "by the heats of." So Meursius, reading a- for the ms. o-ptaret, which is retained by LB., Orelli, and others. The ms. reading is explained, along with the next words vota immortalitatis, by Orelli as meaning "sought by His prayers," with reference to John xvii. 24, in which he is clearly mistaken. Heraldus conjectures p-o-r-ta-s a-p-er-taret, "opened paths...and the gates of immortality." The words which follow, ut non in cunctos, etc., have been thus transposed by Heraldus, followed by later editors; but formerly they preceded the rest of the sentence, and, according to Oehler, the ms. gives utrum, thus: "(You ask) whether He has both extended to all...ignorance? who, if He was not," etc. Cf. book i. (this page) note 3, supra So the ms., reading periculum i-g-n-ora-tionis, for which Meursius suggests i-n-teri-tionis-"danger of destruction.." Pl. This seems the true rationale of the sentence, viewed in relation to the context. Immediately before, Arnobius suggests that the hatred of Christ by the heathen is unjustifiable, because they had suffered nothing at His hands; now an opponent is supposed to rejoin, "But He has deserved our hatred by assailing our religion." The introductory particles at enim fully bear this out, from their being regularly used to introduce a rejoinder. Still, by Orelli and other editors the sentence is regarded as interrogative, and in that case would be, "Has He indeed merited our hatred by driving out," etc., which, however, not merely breaks away from what precedes, but also makes the next sentence somewhat lame. The older editors, too, read it without any mark of interrogation. i.e., according to Orelli, to the wants of men; but possibly it may here have the subjunctive meaning of "more full of service," i.e., to God. So the ms., reading perpetuarum pater, fundator conditor rerum, but all the editions pa-ri-ter, "alike," which has helped to lead Orelli astray. He suggests et fons est perpetu us pariter, etc., "perpetual fountain,...of all things alike the founder and framer." It has been also proposed by Oehler (to get rid of the difficulty felt here) to transfer per metathesin, the idea of "enduring," to God; but the reference is surely quite clear, viewed as a distinction between the results of God's working and that of all other beings. So the ms. and almost all edd, reading da verum judicium, for which Heraldus suggested da naturae, or verum animae judicium, "give the judgment of nature," or "the true judgment of the soul," as if appeal were made to the inner sense; but in his later observations he proposed da puerum judicem, "give a boy as judge," which is adopted by Orelli. Meursius, merely transposing d-a, reads much more naturally ad-"at a true judgment." The ms. reading is illum testem d-e-um constituimus improbarum, retained in the edd. with the change of -arum into -orum. Perhaps for deum should be read r-e-r-um, "make him witness of wicked things." With this passage compare iii. 31-33. It seems necessary for the sake of the argument to read this interrogatively, but in all the edd. the sentence ends without any mark of interrogation. Typhus-tufov. Lit., "He chose...to stand." Lit. "the ignorance of wretched men from the worst robbers," i.e., the false prophets and teachers, who made a prey of the ignorant and credulous. John viii. 46. Lit., "Are the things clear with you which," etc. So the ms., followed by both Roman edd., Hildebrand and Oehler, reading passa, which Cujacius (referring it to patior, as the editors seem to have done generally) would explain as meaning "past," while in all other editions cassa, "vain," is read. Lit., "the touching of no anticipation." Lit., "purer reasoning." Lit., "that is." This clause Meursius rejects as a gloss. i.e., If you believe Christ's promises, your belief makes you lose nothing should it prove groundless; but if you disbelieve them, then the consequences to you will be terrible if they are sure. This would seem too clear to need remark, were it not for the confusion of Orelli in particular as to the meaning of the passage. Lit., "most worthy even of weeping and pity." Redarguat. This sense is not recognised by Riddle and White, and would therefore seem to be, if not unique, at least extremely rare. The derivative redargutio, however, is in late Latin used for "demonstration," and this is evidently the meaning here. Fidem vobis faciunt argumenta credendi. Heraldus, joining the two last words, naturally regards them as a gloss from the margin; but read as above, joining the first and last, there is nothing out of place. Lit., "tranquillity being assumed, passed to placid feelings." Res, "the thing." Lit., "on chance encounters." Rationes cognitas. There is some difficulty as to the meaning of these words, but it seems best to refer them to the argumenta credendi (beginning of chapter, "do not even these proofs"), and render as above. Hildebrand, however, reads tortiones, "they accept the tortures which they know will befall them." The ms. reads et non omnium, "and by a love not of all the virtues," changed in most edd, as above into atque omnium, while Oehler proposes et novo omnium, "and by fresh love of all," etc. It will be remembered that the transposition of leaves in the ms. (note on ii. 1) occurs here, and this seems to account for the arbitrary reading of Gelenius, which has no ms. authority whatever, but was added by himself when transposing these chapters to the first book (cf. p. 432, n. 14), atque nectare ebrii cuncta contemnant-"As if intoxicated with a certain sweetness and nectar, they despise all things." The same circumstance has made the restoration of the passage by Canterus a connecting of fragments of widely separated sentences and arguments. Lit., "all the things of the world." Here the argument breaks off, and passes into a new phase, but Orelli includes the next sentence also in the fifth chapter. Lit., "to the assent of that credulity." So the ms., reading conditi vi mera, for which Orelli would read with Oudendorp, conditae-"by the pure force of recondite wisdom." The ms., however, is supported by the similar phrase in the beginning of chap. 8, where tincti is used. So the ms., reading aliud, for which Stewechius, adopting a suggestion of Canterus, conjectures, altius et profundius-"something deeper and more profound." Others propose readings further removed from the text; while Obbarius, retaining the ms. reading, explains it as "not common." Lit., "because you are, etc." Lit., "either yourselves to utter," etc. Incomptus, for which Heraldus would read inconditus, as in opposition to "harmonious." This is, however, unnecessary, as the clause is evidently opposed to the whole of the preceding one, No trace of either of these works has come down to us, and therefore, though there has been abundance of conjecture, we can reach no satisfactory conclusion about them. It seems most natural to suppose the former to be probably part of the lost satires of Lucilius, which had dealt with obscene matters, and the author of the latter to be the Atellane poet of Bononia. As to this there has been some discussion; but, in our utter ignorance of the work itself, it is as well to allow that we must remain ignorant of its author also. The scope of both works is suggested clearly enough by their titles-the statue of Marsyas in the forum overlooking nightly licentious orgies; and their mention seems intended to suggest a covert argument against the heathen, in the implied indecency of the knowledge on which they prided themselves. For Fornicem Lucilianum (ms. Lucialinum) Meursius reads Caecilianum. Lit., "Has that thing published never struck," etc. There is clearly a reference to 1 Cor. iii. 19, "the wisdom of this world." The argument breaks off here, and is taken up from a different point in the next sentence, which is included, however, in this chapter by Orelli. So Gelenius, followed by Canterus and Orelli, reading primum et ipsi, by rejecting one word of the ms. (et quae). Canterus plausibly combines both words into itaque-"therefore." LB. reads ecquid-"do you at all," etc., with which Orelli so far agrees, that he makes the whole sentence interrogative. So restored by Stewechius; in the first ed. perspiciam (instead of am-us) "if I perceive the truth," etc. So the ms. very intelligibly and forcibly, res...invida, but the common reading is invid-i-a-"whom something...with envy." The train of thought which is merely started here is pursued at some length a little later. The ms. gives fedro, but all editions, except the first, Hildebrand, and Oehler, read Phaedone, referring, however, to a passage in the first Alcibiades (st. p. 129), which is manifestly absurd, as in it, while Alcibiades "cannot tell what man is," Socrates at once proceeds to lead him to the required knowledge by the usual dialectic. Nourry thinks that there is a general reference to Phaedr., st. p. 230,-a passage in which Socrates says that he disregards mythological questions that he may study himself. [P. 447, note 2, infra.] Lit., "changed with the rottenness of some moisture." The reference is probably to the statement by Socrates (Phaedo, st. p. 96) of the questions with regard to the origin of life, its progress and development, which interested him as a young man. So the ms., LB., and Oehler, but the other edd. make the verb plural, and thus break the connection. Lit., "established in the common senses." Arnobius overstates the fact here. In the passage referred to (Th., st. p. 158), Socrates is represented as developing the Protagorean theory from its author's standpoint, not as stating his own opinions. Lit., "by the stretching out of rays and of light." This, the doctrine of the Stoics, is naturally contrasted in the next clause with that of Epicurus. Lit., "oil refuses to suffer immersion into itself," i.e., of other fluids. So LB., followed by Orelli, reading impenetrabil-em, for the ms. impenetrabil-is, which is corrected in both Roman edd. by Gelenius, Canterus, and Elmenhorst -e, to agree with the subject oleum-"being impenetrable is ever," etc. Lit., "a god." So the edd., generally reading fatua for the ms. futura, which is clearly corrupt. Hildebrand turns the three adjectives into corresponding verbs, and Heinsius emends deliret (ms. -ra) et fatue et insane-"dotes both sillily and crazily." Arnobius here follows Lucr., iii. 445 sqq. Lit., "something of truth." The ms. has a t-tor-o-s, corrected by a later writer a-c-tor-e-s, which is received in LB. and by Meursius and Orelli. Lit., "unite marriage partnerships." Lit., "be safe and come." Or, "in successive battles"-praeliorum successionibus. Lit., "with ocular inspection, and held touched." "Fire" is wanting in the ms. Arnobius here allows himself to be misled by Cicero (Tusc., i. 10), who explains enteleceia as a kind of perpetual motion, evidently confusing it with endeleceia (cf. Donaldson, New Crat., § 339 sqq.), and represents Aristotle as making it a fifth primary cause. The word has no such meaning, and Aristotle invariably enumerates only four primary causes: the material from which, the form in which, the power by which, and the end for which anything exists (Physics, ii. 3; Metaph., iv. 2, etc.). I.it., "with indivisible bodies." Pl. So the ms., LB., and Hildebrand, reading Archesilae, while the others read Archesilao, forgetting that Arcesilas is the regular Latin form, although Archesilaus is found. Sententiarum is read in the first ed. by Gelenius, Canterus, and Ursinus, and seems from Crusius to be the ms. reading. The other edd., however, have received from the margin of Ursinus the reading of the text, sectarum. In the first ed., and that of Ursinus, the reading is, nonne apud ea, "in those things which they say, do they not say," etc., which Gelenius emended as in the text, nonne ipsa ea. Cf. Diog. Laert. ix. 9, where Heraclitus is said to have taught that fire-the first principle-condensing becomes water, water earth, and conversely; and on Thales, Arist., Met., A, 3, where, however, as in other places, Thales is merely said to have referred the generation and maintenance of all things to moisture, although by others he is represented as teaching the doctrine ascribed to him above. Cf. Cic., de Nat. Deor., i. 10, and Heraclides, Alleg. Hom., c. 22, where water evaporating is said to become air, and settling, to become mud. There is some difficulty as to the reading: the ms., first ed., and Ursinus give numero s-c-ire, explained by Canterus as meaning "that numbers have understanding," i.e., so as to be the cause of all. Gelenius, followed by Canterus, reads -os scit-"does Pyth. know numbers," which is absurdly out of place. Heraldus approved of a reading in the margin of Ursinus (merely inserting o after c), "that numbers unite," which seems very plausible. The text follows an emendation of Gronovius adopted by Orelli, -o ex-ire. So the ms., reading ut; but Orelli, and all edd. before him, aut-"or do they." i.e., that truth knowable by man exists. So the ms. reading nostra in-credulitate, for which Ursinus, followed by Stewechius, reads nostra cum. Heraldus conjectured vestra, i.e., "in your readiness of belief," you are just as much exposed to such ridicule. Heraldus has well suggested that plurimum is a gloss arising out of its being met with in the next clause. So the ms. and edd., reading Platoni; but Ursinus suggested Plotino, which Heraldus thinks most probably correct. There is, indeed, an evident suitableness in introducing here the later rather than the earlier philosopher, which has great weight in dialog with the next name, and should therefore, perhaps, have some in this case also. The ms. and both Roman edd. give Crotonio, rejected by the others because no Crotonius is known (it has been referred, however, to Pythagoras, on the ground of his having taught in Croton). In the margin of Ursinus Cronius was suggested, received by LB. and Orelli, who is mentioned by Eusebius (Hist. Eccl., vi. 19, 3) with Numenius and others as an eminent Pythagorean, and by Porphyry (de Ant. Nymph., xxi. ), as a friend ot Numenius, and one of those who treated the Homeric poems as allegories. Gelenius substitutes Plotinus, followed by most edd. [Thus everywhere he writes as a Christian.] Stemus, the admirable correction of Gelenius for the ms. tem-p-us. Orelli, following Stewechius, would omit ita. Hildebrand thinks compescere here a gloss, but it must be remembered that redundancy is a characteristic of Arnobius. The superlative is here, as elsewhere, used by Arnobius instead of the comparative. i.e., so as to show the relations existing between them. Perhaps "axioms and postulates." According to Crusius, non is not found in the ms.. White and Riddle translate candidule, "sincerely," but give no other instance of its use, and here the reference is plainly to the previous statement of the literary excellence of the philosophers. Heraldus suggests callidule, "cunningly," of which Orelli approves; but by referring the adv. to this well-known meaning of its primitive, all necessity for emendation is obviated.